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Legal implications for the US in transferring CCS technology to China

Introduction
Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) is considered, in many circles, a critical
technological development that may make a significant contribution to future climate change
mitigation efforts, by reducing carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants. CCS is the
‘combination of three separate technologies that are relatively mature but that have not yet
been integrated at a commercial scale’1. As the name suggests, there are three processes
involved in the deployment of CCS technology – the separation and capture of carbon
dioxide (CO2) from industrial facilities and power plants either before or after combustion,
the compression and transportation of CO2 from plants to storage sites, and injection of the
CO2 into deep geological formations for permanent storage2. Current CCS demonstration
projects in China are focused on the initial ‘capture’ phase of the CCS technological process,
which involves a choice of pre or post-combustion capture technology3.
China is focusing on implementation of ‘demonstration plants’ that will be able to
demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the various components of CCS technology in
reducing CO2 emissions, and the projected costs of CCS deployment, before it proceeds to
commercial scale demonstration at either new or existing coal-fired power plants4. Section I
of this paper will provide an overview of the rationale for the increasing involvement of
United States (US) public and private sector entities in CCS demonstration project
development in China. This will be followed by an analysis of some of the significant legal

1

The Climate Group, TOWARDS MARKET TRANSFORMATION IN CHINA, Briefing Paper (July 2010) at
2, available at http://www.theclimategroup.org/publications/2010/7/23/ccs-towards-market-transformation-inchina/
2
Asia Society, A ROADMAP FOR US-CHINA COLLABORATION ON CARBON CAPTURE AND
SEQUESTRATION, (November 2009) at 17, available at
http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/AS_CCS_TaskForceReport.pdf
3
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle technology (ICGCC) is a pre-combustion capture technology
deployed at coal-fired power plants. It is the focus of much of the current CCS project development in China:
Asia Society, id., at 17.
4
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 17.
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and related political and economic implications for US public and private sector investors,
and US CCS technological proprietors, in participating in CCS demonstration projects in
China through the provision of investment and technology transfers5. Section II will consider
Chinese intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement issues. Section III will examine
existing and potential financing mechanisms for the expansion of the Chinese CCS sector,
and Section IV will provide an overview of potential US and international concerns in
collaborating with China in the current Chinese regulatory context, which is still developing
in response to the expansion of CCS demonstration projects.

I

Rationale for US transfer of CCS technology to China
In light of the substantial coal reserves distributed across the US6, the increasing use of

CO2 in domestic Enhanced Oil Recovery operations (EOR)7, and the economic importance of
the coal industry and influence of the ‘coal states’ in US politics8, the US government has set
a goal of developing 5–10 domestic commercial CCS demonstration projects by 20169.
Nevertheless, despite US expertise in the area of sequestration technology, there remain
certain barriers to the implementation of large-scale CCS demonstration projects in the US,
relative to China. These include the lack of domestic economic incentives for private sector

5

“Technology transfer’ may be defined as a ‘broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how,
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders’.
‘Transfer’ encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries...it
comprises the process of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including the capacity to
choose it and adapt it to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies”: IPCC, IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT – METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER –
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland) at 3, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/tectran/index.php?idp=0
6
Large coal reserves are located in Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, North Dakota, Montana, Texas
and Pennsylvania. Coal production is also dispersed; University College London (UCL) Carbon Capture Legal
Programme, FINANCIAL STRATEGIES TO INCENTIVISE CCS IN THE UNITED STATES – WHY PAY
FOR CCS? (webpage), accessed March 2011, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cclp/ccsfinancing-usa.php
7
UCL, id.
8
UCL, supra, note 6.
9
US EPA, REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,
(August 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf, as
cited in UCL, supra note 6.
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CCS investment in the US (in the absence of a carbon price), and the ‘uncertain’ domestic
CCS legal framework, including the lack of clarity concerning long-term liabilities for CO2
storage and related property rights10.
Although China shares some of these US domestic barriers to large-scale CCS
development, including in particular, the absence of a comprehensive domestic CCS
regulatory framework, the balance of circumstances favor the initial development of CCS
demonstration technology in China, from the perspective of the US Government and private
sector investors. This section will examine the rationale for US investors and CCS technology
proprietors in collaborating with the emerging Chinese CCS sector, including the relatively
lower cost and more rapid deployment of CCS demonstration projects in China, the
favourable siting conditions for CCS projects and related economic and political benefits for
the US in facilitating China’s efforts to engage in domestic emissions reductions.
A Lower cost and accelerated deployment of Chinese CCS projects
The deployment of CCS demonstration projects, assisted by US technology, is presently
less expensive in China, in terms of the relative cost of necessary CCS project components,
including steel, cement, and labor11, and the avoided costs from expedited project
implementation in China due to a lack of regulatory obstacles12. In addition, over one
hundred coal gasifiers, fitted to many existing Chinese commercial power plants, produce

10
UCL, supra note 6. A recent example of the extent of barriers to CCS deployment in the US has been the
failure of the initial design for the US Government-financed ‘FutureGen’ coal-gasification project with a CCS
component, in Illinois. The project was cancelled in 2008 due to substantial cost over-runs and high labor costs.
The US Department of Energy (DOE) has recently re-launched the project as ‘FutureGen 2.0’: Stephen Power,
U.S. Drops Coal Project, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (January 31, 2008), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120175397548831345.html and US DOE Press Release, SECRETARY CHU
ANNOUNCES FUTUREGEN 2.0, (August 5, 2010), available at http://www.energy.gov/news/9309.htm
11
NRDC, IDENTIFYING NEAR-TERM OPPORTUNITIES FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND
SEQUESTRATION (CCS) IN CHINA, (NRDC, October 2009) at 2, available at
http://china.nrdc.org/library/identifying-near-term-opportunities-carbon-capture-and-sequestration-ccs-china
12
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 10.
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residual pure streams of CO213. These emissions are easier and therefore less expensive to
capture, relative to emissions from combustion plants14. In broad terms, China’s projected
construction costs for ICGCC power plants are approximately one third to one half the
estimated costs of similar US and European projects15, providing a strong incentive for US
financing and CCS technology transfer to China in the short term.
As discussed in Section IV, the Chinese regulatory environment also enables rapid
implementation of CCS demonstration projects, relative to the US, expediting the necessary
research and development phase for CCS technology16. The assurance of rapid deployment
reduces overall project costs and facilitates a shorter period between initial capital
expenditure and eventual return on investment, attracting substantial private and public
investment in Chinese CCS projects17. US-Chinese collaboration is also expected to bring
forward the deployment of US CCS facilities by five to ten years, with associated benefits for
the US in meeting its future international greenhouse gas reduction commitments18.
B Favorable siting conditions
Initial studies of China’s geology indicate that it is particularly well suited to the
deployment of CCS demonstration projects, relative to the US. This is due to the number of
sub-surface geological sinks or ‘pore space’ potentially available for CO2 storage, and the
location of existing substantial point sources of CO2 pollution (coal-fired power plants)

13

Asia Society, supra note 2, at 7.
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 7. The NRDC cites an (IRSM-PNNL) joint study that estimates that the cost of
deploying CCS technology for high-purity CO2 streams from certain Chinese point sources, located for the most
part within 80km of suitable geologic sinks, would be in the realm of $10 to 20 per tonne of CO2; NRDC, supra
note 11, at 2.
15
Craig Hart and Hengwei Liu, Advancing Carbon Capture and Sequestration in China: a Global Learning
Laboratory, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, (CHINA
ENVIRONMENT SERIES 2010/2011), available at
http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.publications&topic_id=1421&imageField.x=11&imageFiel
d.y=12 at 119.
16
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 9.
17
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 9.
18
Asia Society, supra note 2, at 9.
14
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adjacent to many of these potential geological storage sites19. The location of point sources of
pollution next to potential geological sinks reduces the need for CO2 transportation
infrastructure, and the potential regulatory risks and costs associated with transportation20.
In terms of the number of potential sites available for CO2 sequestration, initial
assessments21 indicate that China has enough deep saline formations (considered potentially
suitable for CO2 storage), to sequester up to 3,066 GtCO2, equivalent to more than 450 times
China’s total CO2 emissions in 200522. Over half of the large point sources of Chinese CO2
emissions are positioned (fortuitously) directly above potential geological sinks, with over
80% of large point sources located within 80 kilometers of a potential geological site23.
C Chinese collaboration addresses US competitiveness concerns
An additional motivation for the US in engaging in collaborative CCS initiatives with
China concerns the US position in the continuing multilateral climate negotiations. The US
has consistently maintained that it is not willing to implement comprehensive domestic
climate legislation without equivalent domestic action by the largest developing nations,
including China. In collaborating with China in the deployment of large-scale CCS
demonstration projects using advanced US technology, the US is facilitating Chinese
domestic efforts to engage in substantial domestic emissions reductions, which may address

19

NRDC, supra note 11, at 2.
NRDC, supra note 11, at 2
21
China has not yet conducted a comprehensive geological survey for the purposes of identifying suitable sites
for CO2 sequestration; Craig Hart and Hengwei Liu, supra note 15, at 113.
22
Study conducted by Li and Wei of the Chinese Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics (IRSM) with the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), as cited in NRDC, supra note 11, at 2.
23
The NRDC cites 1,623 large point sources of CO2 emissions in China, which each emit more than 100,000
tCO2 every year; NRDC, supra note 11, at 2. Other studies have concluded that China has enough capacity to
store over 100 years of its CO2 emissions from large point sources, and that over 90% of the country’s large
CO2 point sources (emitting over 100,000 tonnes of CO2 per year) are within 100 miles of onshore
sequestration reservoirs: (Dahowski et al., 2009) as cited in Craig Hart and Hengwei Liu, supra note 15, at 114.
20
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(to some extent) US economic competitiveness reasons for deferring domestic regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions24.
However, as the recent United Steelworkers Petition to the US Government25 (the
Petition) and subsequent US–Chinese WTO dispute26 regarding Chinese renewable energy
subsidies indicates, the US and Chinese economies are competing vigorously to become the
leading ‘green’ or low-carbon economy of the future. The Petition refers to President
Obama’s 2010 State of the Union Address, in which the President argued that ‘the nation that
leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And
America must be that nation’27. As such, the US Government recognizes that its collaboration
with China in the transfer of CCS technology will ultimately benefit China in the race to
become the leading nation in the emerging global ‘clean energy economy’. For this reason,
intellectual property protection remains a critical concern for US stakeholders in the transfer
of US proprietary CCS technology to China.

II Intellectual property implications – protection for US and joint intellectual property
One of the more widespread concerns for US stakeholders in providing Chinese access to
US proprietary CCS technology is ensuring sufficient protection of the underlying IPR in that
technology. The US and Chinese governments have entered into a multitude of bilateral
agreements and memoranda of understanding involving IPR since 1979, and China has
24

Asia Society, supra note 2, at 12.
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO CLC (USW), China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green
Technology, PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, AS
AMENDED, Executive Summary -Public Version, Volume 1 of 9, (September 9 2010)(PETITION), at 1, as
cited in M Gerrard, L6038, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, (Columbia Law School Course Materials Vol.3, Spring
2011), at 186.
26
Office of the United States Trade Representative, UNITED STATES REQUESTS WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT CONSULTATIONS ON CHINA’S SUBSIDIES FOR WIND POWER EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS, (Press Release, December 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con
27
PETITION; supra note 25, at 1.
25
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accepted additional IPR–related obligations in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2001. However, uncertainty remains regarding the extent to which US IPR in CCS
technology will be recognized and enforced in China, in terms of both existing US IPR
associated with technology transfers for CCS projects, and future IPR that will be developed
through collaboration with Chinese counterparts on Chinese CCS demonstration projects.
This section will provide a brief overview of China’s existing bilateral agreements with the
US and Chinese WTO obligations to protect foreign intellectual property associated with
imported technology, the nature of US concerns about inadequate recognition or enforcement
of IPR in China, and recent developments that may provide greater flexibility and encourage
closer collaboration in the future development of CCS technology.
A China’s existing IP obligations – international and domestic
The Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement of 197928 after the resumption of
US-Chinese trade relations, and the 1991 Amending Agreement established an initial IPR
framework to govern the parties’ collaboration on joint technological initiatives. The 1991
Annex on the Protection of Intellectual Property (Annex I) provides that the parties ‘shall
ensure adequate and effective protection of intellectual property created or furnished under
this Agreement’. The IP Annex addresses the allocation of rights, interests and royalties
between the parties in respect of the covered IP, and provides for dispute resolution through
binding arbitration29.

28

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, (January 31 1979), available at http://www.us-chinacerc.org/pdfs/US_China_Scientific_Technological_31_Jan_1979.pdf
29
AGREEMENT TO EXTEND AND AMEND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, (May 22 1991), available at
http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US_China_Scientific_Technological_22_May_1991.pdf
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In 1992, the US and China entered into an MOU on the Protection of Intellectual
Property, which imposed certain obligations on the Chinese government to both expand
Chinese IP law and accede to certain multilateral IP agreements. The provisions implicated
by CCS technology transfer, included Chinese patent30 and ‘trade secret’ protections31 for
foreign IPR, and enforcement32 obligations. This was followed by China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 200133, and the establishment in 2004 of the US-China
Intellectual Property Working Group of the Joint Commission of Commerce and Trade
(JCCT)34. Most recently, in November 2009, the US and China established a bilateral $150
million joint research and development program in the U.S. – China Clean Energy Research
Center (CERC)35. Through the CERC framework36, the US and China have entered into Joint
Work Plans in relation to Energy Efficiency, Clean Vehicles and a five-year Joint Work Plan
for Advanced Coal, which focuses on the joint development of CCS technology in both
China and the US37.

30

This includes compulsory licensing under certain specified conditions: MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (MOU) (January 17 1992), Article 1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/4/4/12279.pdf
31
MOU, id., Article 4.
32
MOU, supra note 30, Article 5.
33
The Protocol governing China’s accession included a commitment to bring Chinese domestic IP laws into full
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and other multilateral trade agreements annexed to the WTO
Agreement; WTO, ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA- DECISION OF 10
NOVEMBER 2001, WT/L/432 (23 November 2011), Article 2(A), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/ChinaAccessionProtocol.pdf
34
US Trade Representative, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at
http://www.ustraderep.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_301/asset_uploa
d_file963_5996.pdf
35
PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE NATIONAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR COOPERATION ON A CLEAN
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER (17 November 2009)(CERC PROTOCOL) and ANNEX I –
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (CERC ANNEX I), available at http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/protocol.pdf
36
CERC PROTOCOL, id.
37
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), JOINT WORK PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON CLEAN
COAL INCLUDING CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE, (January 18 2011) at 1, available at
http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US/CERC-Coal_JWP_english_OCR_18_Jan_2011.pdf
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In addition to China’s extensive bilateral and multilateral IPR commitments, the Chinese
government has embarked on a series of reforms to its domestic IP regime, particularly
following the economic reforms involving the opening of domestic markets to international
trade from 1978–197938. The domestic Chinese legal regime includes a Trademark Law
(1982), a Patent Law (1984), Copyright Law (1990), and consolidated Software regulations
(1991), which were modified to align with WTO commitments after Chinese accession in
200139.
B Areas of concern for the US regarding IPR in technology transfer
Two areas of critical concern for the US are firstly, ensuring sufficient enforcement of
existing US IPR brought to China in the transfer of CCS technology following the
implementation of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, and secondly, the interaction of the
Chinese IP regime with its ‘technology for markets’ strategy. The US IPR concerns in
relation to CCS technology stem from historical tensions between the US and Chinese
governments in the context of trade disputes in the 1990s, which came ‘close to a full-scale
trade war’40 over US concerns about inadequate Chinese enforcement of counterfeited US
products, particularly in relation to software and films41. Although various forms of IPR are
implicated by CCS technology, including patents, trademarks, and trade secrets or
‘knowhow’, the primary concern for IPR holders in the context of CCS technology concerns
the enforcement of foreign patents42.

38

Paul Crookes, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME EVOLUTION IN CHINA AND INDIATECHNOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE, (Brill, The Netherlands, 2010), at
148.
39
Paul Crookes, id., at 149.
40
Paul Crookes, supra note 38, at 151.
41
Paul Crookes, supra note 38, at 151.
42
Antony Taubman and Jayashree Watal, THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT – A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICYMAKERS, 11.xii.2009. (Initial Consultation Draft, Intellectual Property
Division of the WTO Secretariat, 2009), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips.../trips_climat_change09_e.doc at 1.
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From the perspective of US CCS technological proprietors holding IPR, the enforcement
of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), introduced in 2007, may potentially weaken
Chinese IPR enforcement efforts. The AML provides that the Chinese IP regime will
distinguish between legitimate uses of IPR by business operators in accordance with Chinese
IP laws and administrative regulations, and “abuses” of IPR43. The stated purposes of the
AML are to protect the public interest and promote the Chinese socialist market economy44.
In light of the ambiguous language used in the IPR provision of the AML concerning IPR
‘abuses’, and the AML’s stated objectives, multinational corporations have raised concerns
that Chinese antitrust regulators would have a basis for restraining foreign IPR holders from
enforcing their IPR against domestic Chinese firms45, despite China’s extensive WTO
commitments relating to IPR.
A second area of concern for US technological proprietors in the CCS context has been
the Chinese practice of negotiating for technology transfer as a condition of foreign
investment approval (providing access to the substantial and potentially lucrative Chinese
market), which has been described as a ‘technology for market’ strategy46. Although
technology transfer is not inherently problematic from an IPR perspective47, the cumulative
effect of China’s ‘technology for markets’ strategy, combined with the perceived insufficient

43

Anti-Monopoly Law (AML); Article 55, as cited in: Jones Day, NEW CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW,
(October 2007), available at http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=4662
44
The AML took effect on August 1, 2008: Jones Day, id.
45
Jones Day, supra note 43.
46
This argument formed a part of the recent USW petition to the USTR about Chinese WTO violations in the
context of the Chinese renewable energy industry, and particularly wind farm subsidies: see PETITION, supra
note 25, at 4.
47
In fact, an objective of TRIPs is to facilitate technology transfer through ensuring minimum standards of IPR
protection. Article 7 provides that the “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology”;
TRIPS: AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
(April 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
320 (1999), 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), as cited in Sigrid Sterckx, The WTO-TRIPs Patent Regime after Doha:
promises and realities, in Paul Torremans, Hailing Shan and Johan Erauw (Eds), INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA, (Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 2007), at 208.
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enforcement of foreign IPR in China48 and implementation of the AML, have made some
multinational technological proprietors (including US-based corporations) hesitant to enter
into commercial agreements involving Chinese technology transfer49. The requirement for
technology transfer without assurance of US-equivalent IPR protection has been, for several
US companies in the renewable energy industry, an unattractive business proposition,
particularly when the proprietary technology represents their commercial ‘crown jewels’ and
the basis for their competitive market position50.
C Recent developments
An emerging IPR issue in the context of greater collaboration between the US and China
on a bilateral level and in the commercial sector on CCS deployment will be ensuring
adequate protection of jointly developed IPR. If one of China’s policy priorities in pursuing
domestic CCS demonstration projects is developing an opportunity for future export
growth51, China will be interested in obtaining control over, or access to, emerging IPR
jointly developed through Chinese CCS demonstration projects52. However, China’s
investment and technology partners, including the US, will expect equal access to that IPR as
a condition of their involvement.

48

Jingzhou Tao cites weak enforcement teams and poor coordination, local protectionism, non-deterrent
administrative penalties and the prohibitive cost of enforcement as some of the problems encountered by the
civil IP enforcement regime in China; Jingzhou Tao, Problems and new developments in the enforcement of
intellectual property rights in China, in Paul Torremans, Hailing Shan and Johan Erauw (Eds), id., at 108–110.
49
Jones Day, supra note 43.
50
The USW petition refers to public complaints made by GE and Siemens AG, and the required licensing of
Evergreen Solar’s solar wafer technology as a condition of Chinese investment in Evergreen’s Chinese
manufacturing plant pursuant to a joint venture agreement in 2009: PETITION, supra note 25, at 4.
51
Richard Morse, Varun Rai and Gang He, Digging In Deep, BUSINESS FORUM CHINA, (February 2010) at
31, available at
http://sprie.stanford.edu/publications/digging_in_deep_carbon_capture_and_storage_technology_in_china_is_dr
iven_by_energy_security_concerns/
52
Richard K. Morse, Varun Rai and Gang He, THE REAL DRIVERS OF CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE IN CHINA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY, (Working Paper 88, August 2009,
Stanford Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD), at 11, available at
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/the_real_drivers_of_carbon_capture_and_storage_in_china_and_implicati
ons_for_climate_policy/

12

Legal implications for the US in transferring CCS technology to China
The US-Chinese bilateral approach under the CERC Protocol should provide a useful
model for US-Chinese private sector collaboration going forward. This approach requires the
negotiation and agreement ex ante of a ‘Technology Management Plan’ for the proper
recognition and allocation of ownership and access to joint IPR (through licensing) and the
respective obligations of the parties to a collaborative CCS project, without which a project
cannot commence53. Addressing IPR obligations upfront will provide the maximum degree of
certainty for investors and make the most of the leverage available to technological
proprietors, before capital is committed to CCS project implementation. A detailed treatment
of IPR in future collaborative CCS development efforts in China will be a necessary
precondition to the ‘scaling up’54 of CCS technology to a commercial scale.

III

Financing of Chinese CCS projects using US technology

Chinese CCS demonstration projects are being financed through a variety of domestic and
international legal mechanisms that reflect the public or private nature of the investment. This
section will provide a brief overview of the main sources of international financing for
Chinese CCS demonstration projects, including international institutions, recent multilateral
climate financing commitments, and existing sources of domestic Chinese and US
investment. This will be followed by an assessment of present barriers to the growth of
private sector investment in Chinese CCS projects, and the legal viability of additional
potential investment mechanisms, including recognition under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and a US coal export tariff on coal exports to China.

53

CERC ANNEX I, supra note 35, at Article II B. (2)(e).
Fred Wellington, Rob Bradley, Britt Childs Staley, Clay Rigdon, Jonathan Pershing, SCALING UP:
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT TO STABILIZE EMISSIONS, (World Resources Institute with
the Goldman Sachs Center for Environmental Markets, April 2007) at 3, available at
http://www.wri.org/publication/scaling-up
54
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A International financing of Chinese CCS demonstration projects
In the short-term, financing through international institutions and multilateral fora will be
critical in overcoming the uncertainty and substantial capital investment costs involved in
developing initial CCS demonstration projects, particularly in developing countries such as
China55. Recent examples from 2009 include the Carbon Capture and Storage Fund (valued at
$21.5 million AUD) arising from a trust fund agreement between the Australian Government
(through funding for the Global CCS Institute) and the Asian Development Bank, to support
deployment of CCS demonstration projects in Asia (with priority being given to Chinese
projects56). The Norwegian Government has also partnered with the Global CCS Institute to
initiate a Carbon Capture and Storage Trust Fund (valued at $8 million USD), administered
by the World Bank as a multi-donor trust fund for CCS deployment in developing countries.
This fund will be administered through World Bank legal mechanisms, which include the
provision of investment loans, credit and guarantees57.

B Chinese and US financing of Chinese CCS demonstration projects
Despite historically falling behind the US in terms of research and development funding
for CCS technology58, the Chinese government and major Chinese corporations in the energy
sector, including the Huaneng Group (China’s largest power producer) and Shenhua Group
(China’s largest coal company) are increasingly involved in financing initial domestic CCS

55

Richard Morse, Varun Rai and Gang He, supra note 52, at 4.
UCL Carbon Capture Legal Programme, FINANCING CCS - OVERVIEW, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cclp/ccsfinancing-overview.php
57
UCL Carbon Capture Legal Programme, id.
58
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demonstration projects, either unilaterally, or in conjunction with US or other international
investors (in light of the high implementation costs of CCS demonstration projects)59.

The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences have provided some
public research funding for domestic CCS technology development, predominantly in the
area of pre-combustion capture technology, where CO2 capture is less complicated and
expensive relative to post-combustion technology60. Some of the more high-profile CCS
demonstration projects led by domestic industry and receiving government funding include
the Huaneng Group-led ‘GreenGen’ ICGCC plant project in Tianjin61, the sequestration
component of the Shenhua-led joint US-China coal-to-synfuels project in Ordos, Inner
Mongolia62 (involving West Virginia University), and the Thermal Power Research
Institute/Huaneng post-combustion capture demonstration projects in Beijing and Shanghai63.
The Huaneng Group and the ENN Group (a Chinese energy corporation) have also developed
their own proprietary coal gasification technologies in the CCS sector64.

US investment has come from both the US Government and major multinational and US
corporations. The primary focus for US Government investment at the bilateral level
(separate from its international and multilateral financial commitments), has been the CERC,
as discussed in Section II. The US and Chinese Governments have made a joint commitment
to a total of $150 million in financing, with the US Department of Energy (DOE) funding
research performed exclusively by US research participants, and MOST and the NEA
59
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funding only research performed by Chinese research participants, in collaborative research
activities65. Funding has also been provided directly from several US universities. In 2009,
for example, the Stanford Global Climate and Energy Project provided almost $2 million
(USD) in funding for a three-year, international collaboration with Peking University, the
China University of Geosciences at Wuhan and the University of Southern California to
research issues arising from large-scale geological sequestration66.

Although barriers to international private sector investment in the Chinese CCS sector
persist, several multinational and US corporations (including Shell, Duke Energy and
Peabody Energy) are becoming involved in Chinese CCS demonstration projects,
predominantly through CCS technology transfer. Duke Energy signed an MOU with
Huaneng in August 2009 for the development of renewable and clean energy technologies67,
and Peabody Energy has contributed CCS technology to the Chinese ‘GreenGen’ project68.
Peabody also announced in January this year, its involvement with the China Huaneng Group
and Calera Corporation (a Californian energy company) in developing a ‘green coal energy
campus’ in the Xilinguole Region of Inner Mongolia. The energy project would include a
1,200 megawatt supercritical power plant that would capture a portion of carbon dioxide
(CO2) and convert it into green building materials, advancing carbon capture technology. The
extent of Peabody’s (presumed) financial investment has not been publicly disclosed69.
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C Barriers to additional private sector investment in Chinese CCS projects
There are many private multinational and US corporations that will have a vested interest
in the future development of CCS technology, including GE, ConocoPhillips and Siemens
(for combustion technology), Alstom, Praxair and Fluor (regarding carbon-capture
technology) and the major oil companies (for sequestration technology)70 – in light of the
utility of CO2 in Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR)71 operations. Although there is substantial
commercial interest in the future successful deployment of CCS technology at a commercial
scale, there are presently several barriers, specific to the CCS sector, to facilitating greater
private sector investment in developing countries such as China.

Sources of concern identified by CCS industry stakeholders, including investors, are the
lack of a carbon price signal, the fact that the introduction of a carbon price may not provide
sufficient incentives for CCS project development without additional government financing72,
the untested nature of CCS technology, the lack of national regulatory frameworks for CCS
project implementation, the need for more financial information about expected upfront
capital investment costs and expected rates of return, and the need for sufficient certainty
regarding specialized CCS-related insurance73 or a governmental commitment to assume the
long-term liability for potential leakage of sequestered carbon74.
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The introduction of CCS technology in coal-fired power plants also involves an ‘energy
penalty’ that has adverse economic implications for private sector investors. The carbon
capture aspect of CCS technology reduces power generation efficiency by 20-30 per cent,
which in turn requires an increase in coal consumption by approximately 20-25 per cent to
generate the same amount of electricity, placing increasing pressure on constrained global
coal supply chains75. Other considerations for private sector investors include the extensive
water demands of CCS technology and the regulation of adverse environmental impacts of
coal extraction.

D Options for facilitating additional financing
In addition to addressing some of the identified barriers to attracting further private sector
financing from multinational and US-based corporations, other proposals have been made to
facilitate additional CCS financing in China. These include the recognition of CCS as an
eligible ‘project activity’ under the CDM, and US proposals to levy a targeted coal export
tariff on exports to China to finance CCS project development.
(i) Recognition of CCS demonstration projects in the CDM
In light of the obligation of all Annex I parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Article 4.576 to finance and promote
technology transfer to developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) may provide a future source of additional financing for CCS
demonstration projects in China, if the CDM is retained in any post-Kyoto multilateral
agreement. The declaration issued at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP 7) in 2001
75
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indicated that the Article 4.5 obligation applied to the financing and deployment of CCS
technology equally with other climate change mitigation options77.
At the sixth meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP.6) in Cancun in December
2010, the parties determined that CCS “is eligible as project activities under the CDM”78,
provided that certain issues identified in the fifth meeting of the parties (CMP.5)79 were
“addressed and resolved in a satisfactory manner”. CMP.6 also requested the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to the UNFCCC to prepare modalities and
procedures for the future inclusion of CCS within the CDM80. As a result, although CCS
technology has now been given conditional approval for CDM project registration, it will not
be an eligible project activity in the CDM in the immediate future.
Inclusion in the CDM would provide an additional source of international financing of
CCS projects in China, through the purchase of Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) offsets
by UNFCCC parties to satisfy their compliance obligations. However, the projected
timeframes for CCS technology to ‘scale up’ to the commercial implementation phase81, the
likelihood that the value of CERs will remain too low to incentivize registration of CCS
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projects under the CDM82, and the increasing problem of establishing ‘additionality’ for
Chinese renewable and ‘clean’ energy projects83 under the CDM procedures will limit the
role of CDM financing in future Chinese CCS technology development.
(ii) Linkages between US coal exports and Chinese CCS development – viability
of a US coal export tariff
An additional mechanism that has been proposed in the US for financing the development
of Chinese CCS demonstration projects would involve a coal export tariff or targeted fee on
coal exports to China84. Unlike the current Chinese export tariff on ‘rare earth’ minerals85,
which discourages trade in these highly valued commodities, a US coal export tariff could
build upon existing US CCS technology transfer initiatives, in directly financing the
implementation of Chinese CCS demonstration projects. The US Government could use the
US taxation system to apportion the proceeds between US and international CCS
demonstration projects, with an emphasis on Chinese CCS projects. As between the US and
China, the US export tax revenue could be legally committed to Chinese CCS development
either through an amendment to the CERC Protocol (as a component of the Clean Coal
Research and Development Work Plan), or through a separate bilateral agreement.
Despite these potential benefits, there are numerous legal, economic and political
problems with the implementation of a US export-based coal tariff. Although export tariffs
82
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are consistent with the WTO framework of multilateral agreements (with approximately one
third of WTO Members imposing some form of export duty86) and are not prohibited as part
of any current regional or bilateral US agreement with China87, they are problematic under
US law.
As a matter of US domestic law, export tariffs are unconstitutional in so far as they are
characterized as a ‘tax’ or a ‘duty laid on Articles exported from any state’ under the ‘Export
Clause’ of the US Constitution88. US Supreme Court jurisprudence has consistently held that
the Export Clause ‘categorically bars Congress from imposing any tax on exports’89.
In addition to exposure to constitutional challenges, a US coal export tariff or dedicated
fee towards investment in Chinese CCS demonstration projects would not be economically or
politically viable for the US. Economically, although China is now a net importer of coal90,
China could simply substitute US coal imports with imports from other net coal exporting
nations such as Australia, in response to higher US coal prices following the imposition of a
US coal export tariff. If China’s core strategic energy objectives are securing energy
independence and security, rather than CO2 mitigation91, it is uncertain whether China would
welcome CO2 mitigation measures designed to increase domestic CCS investment unless
those measures satisfied Chinese strategic objectives.
Politically, it is also highly unlikely that either the Chinese Government or US coal
producers would support the imposition of a targeted US coal export tariff. The Chinese
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Government would not accept US financing in circumstances where it would have limited
control over where it would be directed. The Chinese Government would also potentially find
a US export tariff objectionable in being generally inconsistent with the US Government’s
position in the various WTO multilateral negotiating rounds advocating reductions in
international trade barriers. US coal producers would also resent any additional regulation
that could potentially raise their production costs and reduce Chinese demand for US coal,
rendering US coal companies uncompetitive in the international coal export market,
particularly in circumstances where access to the Chinese coal market has become an
increasingly important strategic priority for the major US coal companies, such as Peabody
Energy and Arch92 in light of declining US domestic demand for coal93.
Coal export tariffs or dedicated fees are one of several potential measures that could
foster linkages between US international coal exports and Chinese CCS project development.
However such measures raise broader legal, political and economic problems in determining
the extent to which one country should be held responsible for the carbon emissions it exports
to other countries in the course of international trade. This is a more complex question that
extends well beyond coal exports, and demonstrates the increasing need for the UNFCCC
multilateral process to engage with the potential conflict between international climate
mitigation obligations and the WTO imperative of reducing economic barriers to
international trade94.
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IV

Chinese regulatory implications of US CCS technology transfer
As CCS demonstration projects are developed in China, the US Government, private

sector investors and stakeholders in the CDM will increasingly expect stringent domestic
Chinese regulation of the CCS industry as a condition of financing, facilitating technology
transfer and the ability to earn CERs under the CDM95. A comprehensive Chinese CCS
regulatory regime will reduce project implementation uncertainties, clarify the allocation of
potential short and long term liabilities between project partners, and improve the overall
environmental outcomes of CCS demonstration projects. A robust Chinese CCS regulatory
regime will also serve US domestic interests in demonstrating the safety of CCS technology
within a regulated environment, facilitating the earlier deployment of demonstration CCS
technology in the US.
There are currently no explicit CCS regulations in China96. However, the NRDC has
noted the existence of over a dozen different domestic laws and regulations administered by
different government agencies that could impact on Chinese CCS projects. As such, NRDC
recommends that China implement a regulatory framework that addresses energy policy and
enforcement issues, including environmental, health and safety requirements for future
Chinese CCS projects97. The World Resources Institute is also collaborating with Tsinghua
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through the Asia Pacific Partnership to specifically address emerging Chinese CCS
regulatory and liability issues98.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a survey of some of the legal, political and economic
implications of the involvement of US public and private investors and CCS technological
proprietors in Chinese CCS demonstration projects, and the legal mechanisms currently
available to facilitate their involvement. Barriers to implementation of wide-scale Chinese
CCS demonstration projects remain, in terms of existing Chinese regulation of intellectual
property and CCS technology, which impacts upon the Chinese ability to attract additional
US and other international private sector investment. However, these barriers are not
insurmountable.
It remains to be seen whether, after a necessary research and development and
demonstration period, the economics of CCS technology will be sufficiently attractive to
secure its place in providing for future US and Chinese domestic energy security and
emissions reduction commitments. Even in a future carbon-constrained regulatory
environment, other renewable technologies may ultimately prove economically more
attractive and environmentally sound than CCS.
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